The 
Introduction
In this paper, I consider the limitations of the business case for Corporate Environmental Responsibility (CER) and the implications of this for corporate law. The business case is the claim that behaving responsibly makes financial sense; that Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) pays. Whether this claim is more than mere 
The importance of the business case claim
While there is no strong definitional consensus, 1 CSR is often understood as involving activities which stretch beyond shareholders to consider stakeholder-type interests, as well as going beyond externally imposed legal requirements which protect those stakeholder concerns. 2 At the heart of CSR debates is this tension between shareholders and stakeholders: for whom should corporations be run? One need not look very far in CSR scholarship or textbooks before finding Milton FriedmanÕs famous New York Times article, declaring that the only social responsibility of business is to increase its profits for shareholders. 3 This version of Ôshareholder primacyÕ is often interpreted to render CSR illegitimate. A consideration of stakeholder interests is in direct contradiction to the requirement to remain singularly focussed on the interests of shareholders. In the extreme, CSR expenditures on, for example, reducing pollution beyond what is required by environmental law, are presented as little more than theft from shareholders as owners of the company: such investments involve Ôspending someone elseÕs money for a general social interest.Õ 4 While expression of the legal issues in such terms involves oversimplification, this characterisation nonetheless frames much CSR literature. 5 And of course, this tension persists in a heated body of corporate law scholarship dating back (at least) 80 years as to the appropriate corporate purpose; should companies be concerned only with the pursuit of profit or, alternatively, should corporations be subject to broader societal obligations? It is against this ongoing debate that the business case for CSR must be understood. Of course, as a justification for CSR, the business case is probably what matters for companies: Ôif CSR palpably fails in financial terms, it cannot last.Õ 7 The simple rhetoric and language that acting responsibly is good for business also plays an important role in legitimising Ônon-businessÕ issues, including the environment, in the eyes of companies themselves, mainstream management theorists and, arguably, even Friedman himself. 8 Indeed, there now seems no end to the variety of CSR type concerns for which business case claims are invoked, including, for example, equality and diversity (including the increase of female participation at boardroom level), 9 improved working conditions (particularly in developing countries) 10 and respect for human rights. 11 Fundamentally, however, the business case purports to simply remove the tension subsisting at the heart of CSR, in the process sidestepping an almost century-old body of corporate governance scholarship. In Ôbusiness case CSRÕ, where a whole host of societal responsibilities are aligned with the generation of corporate profit, the polarity in the debate simply collapses --shareholders and society no longer compete.
12
Empirical evidence for the business case The literature on the business case is extensive and a thorough overview is beyond the scope of this paper. 13 However, two separate meta-analyses provide a useful way in to the volume of empirical evidence. 14 Orlitzky suggests that environmental performance seems negligibly but nonetheless positively related to business performance. 24 The most forceful evidence of an environmental business case concerns eco-efficiency measures and environmentally differentiated (ÔgreenÕ) products influencing the more intangible, softer aspects of business practice. 25 However, not only is this relationship very slight in any event,
there are a number of reasons for scepticism as to the empirical basis for the environmental business case. First, of course, there is the string of methodological concerns (outlined above). Second, establishing causal connections remains problematic. 26 It has yet to be demonstrated that positive relationships between CER and CFP are not a matter of reverse causality, where profitable firms are simply more able to afford environmental performance investments. 27 Third, there is no agreement as to the existence of systemic negative relationships, either that behaving badly is bad 17 Orlitzky, above n 14, p 56. 18 See, for example, the commentators referenced above n 16. 19 Margolis and Walsh, above n 12, p 13; see also Allouche and Laroche, above n 13; Cowe and Hopkins, above n 13. This might be characterised as a move away from establishing the business case for responsibility to understanding the varying and idiosyncratic business cases for corporate responsibility. This position acknowledges that there is no ubiquitous financial justification for engaging in CSR strategies and instead, more recent research seeks to unearth those factors which explain the existence of win-win situations.
34
Corporate waste reduction measures are a classic case of both the existence of a business case for corporate environmental responsibility, as well as its variability.
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Waste reduction offers numerous environmental benefits. It lessens the reliance on environmentally harmful disposal techniques and reduces the demand for raw materials, thus limiting the environmental damage associated with sourcing and transporting virgin materials.
36
At the same time, resource efficiency measures such as waste reduction are often considered inherently good for business; waste disposal is not free, but simply wasting materials is costly in itself. 37 Estimates vary, but UK businesses could achieve cost savings amounting to billions through waste minimisation. Regarding supermarket waste specifically, there would appear to be some scope for the profitable reduction of waste. 39 For example, supermarkets have developed sophisticated and efficient systems for stock management, and widely used electronic point of sale systems cut down on food waste through improved records and demand forecasting. 40 An increasingly high-profile (and reputational) concern for supermarkets is packaging waste. In response, product light weighting strategies, particularly the use of aluminium and glass, has reduced both the quantity (and hence cost) of material used as well as the energy consumed in transport. 41 A number of supermarkets have made packaging reduction pledges and/or are signatories to relevant Ôvoluntary agreementsÕ.
42
Participation in these schemes is justified by reference to a business case, either in the form of direct cost savings or the perceived reputational gains flowing from participation.
43
Despite these opportunities, however, research highlights how CSR often fails at the first hurdle of simply identifying business case opportunities. The ability to do so is dependent upon, amongst other things, sufficient technical expertise, information, management motivation and resources. This capability is also hindered by bounded rationality, where a focus on perceived core business functions misses the scope for savings which might be made through environmentally beneficial behaviour. 44 The difficulty in identifying and implementing such strategies is even more challenging if the financial rewards accrue only in the longer term. 45 Failures to engage in resource efficiency are classic examples of this, and in the area of waste reduction bounded rationality remains a problem: Ôthe single biggest barrier to waste reductionÕ is lack of awareness. 46 In addition, prejudices regarding the use of certain recycled materials persist, despite the existence of quality protocols. 47 Legal intervention can also create perverse incentives. For example, the landfill tax is weight-based, making it cheaper to landfill lighter materials, in turn lowering the incentive to recycle them. This operates against business case strategies such as product light weighting, particularly with the use of aluminium, large amounts of which are sent to landfill despite being infinitely recyclable. These difficulties notwithstanding, clearly there are considerable environmental and financial win-win opportunities. Business case efforts such as resource efficiency ought, therefore, to be actively encouraged, particularly in view of problems associated with bounded rationality. On a more general level, the rhetoric of the business case has also played an important role in placing traditionally Ônon-businessÕ issues on the corporate agenda Ð environmental and other societal concerns become (more) legitimate business issues. 49 To this extent, the business case has some appeal. However, there are deeper reasons, beyond uncertainty as to the empirical evidence and the challenges involved in encouraging win-win investments, for which one might wish to be concerned about the business case claim. It is to some of these deeper objections that I now turn.
Deeper objections to the business case for corporate environmental responsibility

Conjuring and associated dangers
The first of these objections is that the rhetoric of the business case, in suggesting a generalised positive relationship between corporate environmental responsibility and CFP, assumes the ready compatibility of economic and environmental concerns. Even if the empirical evidence points to an overall positive relationship, points of conflict between environmental and economic goals do and will continue to exist. For this reason, conjuring imagery is often invoked in critiques of the business case. Doreen McBarnet refers to so-called win-win situations as Ôsleight of handÕ, masking the scope for conflict. 50 For Walley and Whitehead, the business case offers illusory Ôrabbit-out-of-the-hat solutionsÕ. 51 It is much better that these conflicts, where they exist, are acknowledged Ð there must be a preference for openness in this regard. 52 As a general body of literature, business case research does not necessarily deny the existence of such trade-offs. However, in taking compatibility as a matter of course, there does remain the potential for tensions between corporate prosperity and environmental goals to be swept under the carpet. So the concern expressed here is not that environmental and economic concerns can never be reconciled. 53 Rather, it is the starting point of ready compatibility which is 49 On these other societal concerns which receive legitimacy in the corporate sphere by reference to the business case, see above n 9, n 10 and n 11. 50 problematic, particularly in view of the potential this has to send counterproductive and potentially dangerous messages regarding the scale of effort and intervention required to ensure environmental protection. The rhetoric of the business case gives the impression that behaving responsibly is easy, and that environmental responsibility is readily assimilated within existing business models. In this sense, the starting point of compatibility privileges a business status quo; many identified Ôbusiness casesÕ, particularly resource efficiency, tinker only with existing forms of economic activity to make them more environmentally sensitive.
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Much broader questions about the fundamentals of a particular industry model (or even its very existence) remain unasked. Similar concerns are mirrored in broader CSR literature --that corporate responsibility initiatives serve primarily the corporate interest (they privilege the business status quo) and simultaneously legitimise and consolidate, rather than challenge, corporate power or damaging but routine business practices. 55 There is also the added danger that the business case provides scope for corporations to attach misleading or exaggerated CSR claims to what may be relatively shallow environmental efforts; the business case may permit or encourage ÔgreenwashÕ activities.
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And of course, when there is a conflict between profits and the environment, where there is no Ôwin-winÕ, there is no guarantee that the environment will come out on top. Indeed, it is far more likely that the environment will lose out, being unable to compete against business imperatives.
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The voice for the environment within the business case
The second of these deeper objections relates to how, in business case CSR, the value of the environment is expressed via the demands of the market. Beyond resource efficiency measures, environmental and economic win-wins exist because certain consumers or investors value environmentally responsible products, services or investment opportunities. However, the environment has no real voice of its own here Ð it is difficult to conceive of the environment as a ÔstakeholderÕ in the way we might think of shareholders, employees and consumers. The CSR literature itself has been 54 Similar concerns have been levelled against sustainable development (see Dobson, above n 53, pp 62-8). For an argument that sustainable development has been co-opted or hijacked by corporations to promote the business status quo (in particular through CSR-type activities geared towards ÔsustainabilityÕ) see Banerjee, above n 14, pp 64-7; SL Hart ÔBeyond Greening: Strategies for a Sustainable WorldÕ(1997) 75(1) Harv Bus Rev 6. 55 See, for example, Banerjee, above n 14, pp 52-9, who refers to this as the Ôemancipatory rhetoricÕ of CSR, where (as is argued here) such rhetoric is misleading or obfuscatory and, ultimately, dangerous. For a different understanding of ÔstakeholderÕ rhetoric, see LM Fairfax ÔThe Rhetoric of Corporate Law: The Impact of Stakeholder Rhetoric on Corporate NormsÕ (2005-6) 31 J Corp L 675. Fairfax uses an Aristotelian conception of rhetoric which, rather than being deceptive or mere double talk, has an inherent ÔtruthÕ value. This includes seeing rhetoric as ÔexpressiveÕ, so that the use of stakeholder language by corporations indicates growing public dissatisfaction with shareholder primacy. 56 unclear on this point, at times even marginalising the environment. 58 Werther and
Chandler, for example, view the environment as part of a companyÕs ÔsocietalÕ group of stakeholders, giving rise to a related concern in sustainable development literature that poverty alleviation is emphasised to the detriment of environmental protection.
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Wheeler and SillanpŠŠ outline a hierarchy of stakeholders: primary social, secondary social and non-social (including the environment).
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Fundamentally, however, the business case expresses the environment indirectly Ð championed through the voice of these other stakeholders, and ultimately through the attribution of financial value. It is questionable whether this allows the environment to compete on its own terms, a problem familiar to environmental lawyers of expressing environmental value within the market.
In essence, the business case turns corporate environmental responsibility and, by extension, the environment, into a commodity. 61 As such, Hanlon argues that an environmental strategy or product is pursued or produced not for the inherent quality it has, but because the market values it enough to justify the investment. The business case for CER is susceptible to similar criticism. Relying on the business case to foster CER lends further credibility to the economic expression of environment value whilst, according to some, simultaneously shifting power away from the (ecological or environmental) citizenry. 68 In essence, it prefers the market over democratic participation (and by extension, legislative intervention). If the business case fails, or in situations where there are no corporate/environmental win-wins, environmental legislation provides an important, additional layer of protection; and the ecological citizenry potentially has an important role in driving this. However, if too much emphasis is placed on the business case, there is a danger that these important modes of environmental voice and protection will be crowded out.
69
Illustration -supermarkets and waste
Many examples of the business case rely on the various competitive advantages to be gained from environmental product differentiation (ÔgreenÕ, or rather, ÔgreenerÕ products). 70 Consumers will pay a premium for an environmentally superior product and shareholders will prefer to invest in environmentally responsible companies. Concerning consumers and supermarkets, this claim is limited. If CSR plays any role in purchasing patterns, it matters only at the margins; quality and price feature more heavily in consumer preferences. 71 Indeed, marketing strategies seem to reflect this trend. Within stores at least, there is little evidence that food retailers consistently use environmental credentials to promote either products or their own retail brands.
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However, given the inherent economic and environmental trade-off in retail industries, the very nature of a consumer-driven business case is itself logically problematic. Environmental degradation is frequently associated with increasing levels of consumption, yet retail business models are premised entirely on maintaining (or increasing) those levels. Viewed with this in mind, a consumer-driven business case for 66 Holder and Lee, above n 53, p 450. The reasons for demanding public participation and deliberation in environmental decision-making are well-rehearsed within environmental law scholarship, in particular that more inclusive participation can yield substantively better outcomes. This is not to lay blame solely on supermarkets. Individuals must take some responsibility for overpurchasing and food waste. However, it is almost trite to acknowledge that altering behaviour towards more sustainable outcomes is extremely challenging. 80 By implying easy solutions, the rhetoric of the business case significantly underestimates the challenges in addressing these embedded trade-offs. And as already indicated, such rhetoric hides the inherent conflict between economic and environmental goals in the context of consumption. Furthermore, trade-offs exist beyond the economic/environmental. The business case also seems to assume compatibility between environmental, social and corporate prosperity goals. Nonetheless, it is clear these can conflict on many levels. For example, from an environmental perspective, conceiving cheaper food and BOGOF offers as an example of corporate responsibility is highly questionable. When factoring in the social perspective, however, the issue increases in complexity. Environmental or ecological goals in themselves can also compete. For example, the pursuit of business case-packaging waste reduction has a number of environmental benefits, in particular by using less material and consuming less energy. However, light-weighting strategies to achieve cost-effective waste reduction has its own environmental costs. all) and so tend to end up in landfill. 81 It is unclear whether reduced material and energy use is the environmentally preferable outcome. Finally, it is not obvious that the question of how to resolve these various tensions and trade-offs is appropriately answered by the economic metrics of the business case. As suggested, political engagement is likely preferable. Indeed, the limits of the business case in capturing non-financial, including environmental values, is also well exemplified by the challenges associated with food waste. Misshapen or slightly discoloured produce are routinely wasted because they do not comply with stringent aesthetic standards imposed by supermarkets. 82 Wholesome food is wasted for cosmetic blemishes. 83 It is unclear whether such attitudes originate with consumers or retailers, 84 but regardless, discarding perfectly edible food for cosmetic reasons suggests that the marketplace neglects foodÕs inherent value as a source of sustenance. A business case for wasting food indicates the prioritisation of foodÕs exchange value, and the profitable creation of food waste suggests a systemic failure to account for the environmental costs associated with both the production and disposal of food. As these brief examples illustrate, there is considerable scope for a number of deeply embedded trade-offs, and the effort necessary to move away from these would be considerable. The assumptive starting point of the business case, that environmental and economic (and other) goals are readily compatible, is thus problematic. There are also a number of values at stake in corporate activities. The business case is incapable of capturing the true significance of these, and as such it is questionable whether the business case provides an appropriate channel through which to resolve tensions between these often conflicting goals.
Whilst supermarket waste makes a useful case study, and acknowledging there are well known problems with making generalisations based on a case study methodology, we might tentatively explore whether the deeper objections to the business case are limited to the supermarket sector or the environmental problem of waste. Waste might for example be considered a Ôspecial caseÕ because waste reduction is sometimes presented as being inherently good for business (although as has been seen, this is not strictly true). But the idea of a prima facie environmental and economic win-win with respect to resource efficiency applies equally to other areas, such as energy efficiency (especially in the context of climate change). 85 More fundamental 81 Laminates are difficult to recycle and plastics such as polyethylene terephthalate (PET), used as a substitute for infinitely recyclable glass, cannot be recycled in this country, see Science and Technology Committee, above n 36. 82 The UK Soil Association estimated that supermarkets reject between 25 and 40 per cent of most British-grown crops, although this is partly owing to EU uniformity rules on fruit and vegetables. Nonetheless, supermarkets are known to impose stricter requirements than these rules, see Stuart, above n 39, p 108. 83 Foresight, above n 74. 84 Ibid; Stuart, above n 39, pp 108-16. 85 In part because of the perceived environmental business case, energy efficiency has featured heavily in climate change mitigation activities, and Government publications frequently invoke similar imperatives when seeking to sell the benefits of moving towards a ÔgreenÕ or low-carbon economy; see HM Government Enabling the Transition to a Green Economy: Government and business working together (Crown Copyright, 2011) pp 2 and 4-5. The building sector has been singled out as a particularly fruitful area for just such initiatives, with success likely to be hampered by energy efficiency Ôbehavioural barriersÕ similar to those outlined above, see R Dawes ÔBuilding to improve energy efficiency in England and WalesÕ (2010) 12(4) Env L Rev 266. UK businesses across a range of economic sectors similarities between waste and other environmental problems lie in the need for deep, challenging and often only hard-won behaviour change. 86 A consumer driven business case for environmental responsibility is oxymoronic in any consumption sector, not just retail grocery, with environmental implications beyond waste management. 87 These similarities suggest that conflict between environmental and corporate goals will exist in other areas, making the business case more generally problematic. Similarly, attaching financial value to environmental goods and bads is controversial and difficult, as discussed above, regardless of the type of environmental damage.
Environmentally unenlightened shareholder value
This final Part considers enlightened shareholder value (ESV) in light of these deeper objections to the business case for CER. The aim is not to provide a comprehensive legal analysis of ESV. There are many interesting questions in this regard, but they have been addressed extensively elsewhere. 88 I outline corporate law issues in broad terms and only to the extent necessary to explain the primary concern in this paper; that is, how ESV problematically embeds the business case as a mandatory corporate law norm, and what this means for section 172 of the Companies Act 2006 from an environmental perspective.
Shareholder exclusivity (in brief) and enlightened shareholder value
The orthodox position in Anglo-American corporate law is that a company should be run for the benefit of its shareholders, what is often referred to as shareholder primacy.
89 I will use instead the term Ôshareholder exclusivityÕ, and I do so to denote the exclusion of non-shareholding stakeholders (such as employees, creditors, customers, the environment, et cetera) from corporate affairs in two broad ways. First, overall shareholder exclusivity as to corporate goal, purpose or objective; the ÔendÕ of (subject to certain thresholds and exemptions) now participate in the Carbon Reduction Commitment Energy Efficiency Scheme, a mandatory emissions trading scheme made slightly more palatable by estimated savings of around £1 billion from reduced energy bills, see J Hopkins ÔThe Carbon Reduction Energy Efficiency Scheme: overview, rationale and future challengesÕ (2010) corporate governance. 90 This denotes that a company be run only in the interests of shareholders, as opposed to the polar opposite of being run in the interests of stakeholders more broadly. Second, shareholder exclusivity as to corporate ÔvoiceÕ, comprising important quasi-participatory rights in corporate affairs (via general meeting), particularly the powers of board appointment and dismissal, the power to make directions and the right to initiate legal proceedings for breaches of directorsÕ duties. 91 Shareholder exclusivity should not be confused with exclusivity as to day-today decision-making control, which vests in the board of directors. 92 In very broad terms, the general position under the Companies Act 2006 is shareholder exclusivity as to corporate voice and governance ends, coupled with director primacy as to corporate governance means. The exclusion of non-shareholding voices from internal corporate affairs is clear; key governance rights vest solely in shareholders to the exclusion of other stakeholders. This exclusivity is part of a broader inside/outside conceptualisation of the company, immediately visible in section 33(1) Companies Act 2006, which provides for a mandatory statutory corporate contract between only shareholders and the company. The company is a ÔclubÕ, where shareholders are within the company, or in the club, and non-shareholding stakeholders deal with the company from the outside. 93 Section 172(1) Companies Act 2006 confirms this shareholder-centric corporate goal or end, but provides a slightly broader stipulation as to the means by which directors must achieve this. For the purposes of this paper we are concerned specifically with section 172(1)(d):
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members [shareholders] as a whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to É the impact of the companyÕs operations on the community and the environment.
Section 172 is at the heart of the legal institution of ESV, and is coupled with a narrative reporting obligation in section 417, which requires directors of certain companies to compile a Ôbusiness reviewÕ to inform members how they have performed these duties. In the case of quoted companies, this must also provide information about environmental matters, including the impact of the companyÕs business on the environment. 94 The impact of the companyÕs operations on the environment is just one of many ÔstakeholderÕ or ÔCSRÕ type concerns which directors are explicitly required to consider within their decision making process. 95 And in view of this (from a CSR perspective), there has been a tendency to view ESV with some optimism, in particular because it is presented as representing a shift away from shareholder exclusivity. 96 Arguably, however, this optimism overstates the divergence between ESV and shareholder exclusivity. 97 As the name suggests, enlightened shareholder value is not a challenge to the exclusivity of shareholders as to corporate goal or voice. There is no direct duty owed to those ÔotherÕ stakeholders, duties are owed to the company, 98 and directors are to act in a way which promotes the success of the company for the benefit of members as a whole. 99 Indeed, the Company Law Reform Steering Group (CLRSG) stated that ESV maintains the ultimate corporate objective of generating maximum value for shareholders. 100 At the same time as maintaining this shareholder exclusive goal, ESV represents the CLRSGÕs belief that directors should adopt an inclusive and long-term approach which recognises wider interests of the community and, to the extent appropriate, minimises negative impacts of corporate activity. 101 The steering group argued that there was nothing explicit in company law and directorsÕ duties which mandated a narrower approach. 102 However, managerial perceptions of (short-term)
shareholder demands, together with widespread misunderstandings in the practical interpretation of the pre-2006 law, militated against the adoption of the desired and more inclusive approach to corporate decision making. 103 As such, section 172 in many ways aims at legal clarification. This notwithstanding, it is arguable that until section 172, shareholder exclusivity as to corporate governance goal was not fully enshrined in law or supported consistently by case law. 104 And on this view, section 172 provides new strength to shareholder exclusivity by way of an Ôunambiguous statement in legislationÕ. 105 The business case as a procedural legal norm In essence, section 172(1)(d) mandates, institutes and embeds the business case for corporate environmental responsibility as a procedural norm. Directors must Ôhave regardÕ to environmental impacts, but only insofar as this contributes to the overall corporate goal of promoting the success of the company for the benefit of shareholders. The environment is valued instrumentally, not because it has any inherent or intrinsic value. 106 As such, section 172 does not sanction profit-sacrificing behaviour motivated by environmental concerns, so that ESV in turn does not provide a direct means by which to address negative environmental externalities. 107 Indeed, the damage recognised under section 172 is not ÔenvironmentalÕ damage, but damage to the success of the company, and this is likely to be measured in purely financial terms (possibly by reference to share price depreciation). 108 Ultimately, therefore, ESVÕs instrumentalality results in the attribution of (corporate) financial worth to environmental value. Furthermore, there remains no real voice for the environment within ESV. While the language surrounding section 172 talks of ÔinclusivityÕ, 109 the exclusivity of shareholder voice is preserved. This includes the important right to initiate legal proceedings for a breach of section 172, so that there is no cause of action for Ôcorporate environmental wrongsÕ exercisable on behalf of the environment by the world at large. 110 In any case, given environmental damage is not recognised, any benefit to the environment that might be gained from pursuing an action for breach of section 172(1)(d) will ultimately be incidental. 111 Fundamentally, as with the business case, the environment remains dependant upon indirect financial expression via market advocates (primarily shareholders, but also customers). 112 No deliberative space is provided to allow for the non-economic expression of environmental concerns within corporate decision-making, and section 172 does not provide legitimacy for CER undertaken on the basis of an inherent value in doing so.
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Nonetheless, Mark Stallworthy, for example, welcomes section 172, arguing that the admission of ideas other than profitability discussed within company processes is Ôfrom an environmental perspective, obviously attractiveÕ. 114 He points, in particular, to the familiarity of procedural tools of regulation in environmental law, as well as the dictation of processes without a substantive environmental standard. 115 However, while procedural requirements in the absence of a substantive standard are relatively common in environmental law, the goal or norm to which the process is geared is normally ÔenvironmentalÕ in some way. The process is imposed because, in theory, it can yield substantively better environmental outcomes. This is lacking in section 172. The process is not geared towards an environmental outcome, since there is no alteration to shareholder exclusivity as to corporate goal. 116 Indeed, the lack of a deliberative space for the appreciation of environmental value brings into stark question the optimism that mere proceduralisation will yield substantially better environmental outcomes. And given profit sacrificing behaviour is not permitted and that, therefore, profitable (regulatory compliant) environmental degradation is sanctioned, ESV seems actually rather indifferent to substantive environmental outcomes. The incidental substantive environmental benefits envisaged under ESV indicate the problematic assumption underpinning the relationship between process and substance in section 172; namely, that the two are somehow mutually supportive. In the language of the business case critique presented herein, this assumes the compatibility of environmental goals and corporate prosperity. But as has already been suggested, this is the wrong starting point; it hides the scope for environmental and economic trade-offs and, more worryingly, sends a potentially dangerous and misleading message regarding the scale of effort necessary to ensure environmental protection. 117 advanced for ESV tends to be achieved by appealing to this type of problematic business case sleight of hand which collapses the divide between the interests of the environment (or society) and shareholders. 118 To clarify, this is not as an argument against procedural approaches generally, but rather that section 172 represents only in a limited way proceduralisation as is typically understood by environmental lawyers. And of course, this should all be accompanied by acknowledging the well-rehearsed limitations of information-based regulation in the environmental context, 119 especially given the purpose of the business review is to provide a section 172 compliance report for shareholders, not environmental information, or broader CSR disclosure, to stakeholders generally. 120 Most importantly, however, we ought to question whether silence may have been preferable to buying, legislatively, into the rhetoric of ready environmental and economic compatibility and embedding within corporate law a shallow, instrumental appreciation of environmental value.
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If corporate law does insist on referencing the environment, then it must move beyond the non-conflictual rhetoric of business cases and purely instrumental environmental value. In view of this, an environmental variant of section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 122 might have been preferable to its successor, section 172.
Section 309 required directors to have regard to the companyÕs employees as well as the interests of shareholders. The phrasing is significant here, given that there is at least a semantic equality between employees and shareholders, and certainly not the immediately noticeable subordinate or instrumental value afforded to stakeholders under section 172. 123 An environmental variant of this duty would potentially allow limited space for the expression of intrinsic environmental value by permitting some environmentally motivated profit sacrificing behaviour, 124 whilst simultaneously avoiding the problematic business case sleight of hand embodied in ESV.
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Given that the enforcement problems associated with section 309 led to the general conclusion that it was Ônext to uselessÕ, an environmental variant of this duty would be far from a solution to the challenges of properly incorporating environmental concerns within corporate law. 126 Nonetheless, by eschewing the problematic business case rhetoric and instrumental environmental value of ESV, an environmental version of section 309 would arguably have been a step in the right direction for some of the reasons why section 172 arguably is not.
Unenlightened shareholders
Under ESV, the shareholder is now conceptualised as being ÔenlightenedÕ as to how their own self-interest might be furthered. This shareholder is said to appreciate how a focus on short-term financial gain, coupled with a disregard for the type of stakeholder concerns listed in section 172(1), will be ÔincompatibleÕ with corporate success in the long term. 127 In essence, shareholders are re-understood as being aware of the business case for CSR, and under section 172(1)(d), the business case for corporate environmental responsibility specifically. One might want to question the understanding of this shareholder as being somehow now ÔenlightenedÕ. The value of the environment to this shareholder is that of instrumental wealth generation, of only a purely financial appreciation of natural or environmental resources, and one who accepts wealth generation in spite of continued environmental degradation as a direct result. Such a shareholder buys in to an assumptive starting point of economic and environmental compatibility, and hence is generally, and uncritically, accepting of the corporate status quo. This shareholder is also mirrored in contemporary approaches to socially responsible investment (SRI) initiatives, the justification for which also tends to rest on a business case and thus similarly buys into an instrumental appreciation of environmental value. 128 While the long-term perspective is an important element of ESV, 129 it adds little to the enlightenment of our section 172 shareholder. The mismatch between the environmental and corporate meaning of the Ôlong termÕ is potentially considerable, and in reality, massive, given companies struggle to think much beyond an annual timeframe, even in the presence of section 172.
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There has been an acknowledgement in some corporate law scholarship that the conception of the shareholder as uniformly concerned with profit generation is increasingly out of step with reality. 131 Instead, ÔrealÕ shareholder interests are linked to both economic and non-economic goals, such that if an individual derives non-financial benefits from socially and morally desirable corporate activities, maximising shareholder value is not the same as maximising shareholder profit.
132 Such shareholders might be considered enlightened, but they are not representative of the shareholder envisioned under section 172. 133 This shareholder remains environmentally unenlightened.
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Conclusion
When viewed in terms of profits, environmental protection is potentially a more credible corporate concern than would otherwise be the case. As such, the business case might be seen as playing an important role in legitimising CER. Furthermore, despite the empirical uncertainty as to a generalised business case, considerable opportunities for environmental and financial win-wins exist. Barriers remain, in particular regarding awareness, but encouraging businesses to seek profitable ways in which to reduce their environmental impact would seem a sensible strategy. However, there are good reasons to operate extreme caution in the reliance we place on the business case. As a generalised claim, the business case assumes the easy compatibility of environmental protection and corporate goals. As has been argued, rhetoric to this effect is potentially unhelpful. A classic type of win-win, resource efficiency, is an excellent example of the way in which business case strategies may involve only relatively minor changes to the fundamentals of an environmentally 129 See above n 127. 130 And much more likely a perspective of between three and six months, see O Aiyegbayo and C Villiers ÔThe enhanced business review: has it made corporate governance more effective?Õ (2011) JBL 699 p 722. One of the respondents to the study outlined in Gunningham et al, above n 25, p 63 referred to this as the Ôtyranny of quarterly returnsÕ, such that long-term benefits can be Ôsubstantially discounted or ignored.Õ 131 133 And indeed, there is some empirical evidence to suggest that the attitudes of investors (generally, as well as after the institution of ESV) do not correspond with more exacting notions of Ôresponsible investmentÕ, see Aiyegbayo and Villiers, above n 130. 134 See also Villiers, above n 113, arguing that enlightened shareholder value, despite first appearances, is not really compatible with (stronger or more transformative) versions of sustainable development, although this argument is more focussed on gender diversity at board level than with environmental concerns. degrading but nonetheless deeply embedded business status quo. Broader or deeper structural and institutional changes are difficult to contemplate within the business case. In addition, the instrumental and purely economic value afforded to environmental protection is problematic, not least because it places reliance on market rather than political impetus for enhanced responsibility.
In view of the declaratory value of legislation, instituting the business case as a mandatory corporate law norm seems problematic. Nonetheless, through section 172, corporate law legislatively endorses a purely financial and instrumental value to environmental protection, underpinned by rhetoric to the effect that environmental and economic goals walk hand in hand. That shareholders who conceive of the environment in such a manner are ÔenlightenedÕ is questionable, especially when such shareholders accept the generation of wealth in spite of continued environmental degradation as a direct result. Rather than mandating a corporate purpose defined by reference to these unenlightened shareholders, it might have been better for corporate law to simply remain silent as to the environment, at least until willing to move beyond the nonconflictual rhetoric of business cases and purely instrumental environmental value.
